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Abstract 
This paper estimates the response of per capita GDP growth to changes in the 
proportion of mature workers across countries. We define and estimate the effect of 
demographic maturity in two ways. First, a growing cohort of working age persons (15-
64) is found to have a large positive effect on growth of GDP per capita. Second, an 
increase in the number of prime age workers (35-54) as a fraction of the total working 
age population (15-64) is found to have a positive but diminishing effect on per capita 
GDP growth. We find that growth peaks when the ratio of prime age workers over the 
potentially active population reaches 0.36. Beyond this ratio, diminishing returns set in. 
Several well known theoretical models of economic growth and labour market 
performance are consistent with these findings. In particular, the standard life-cycle 
framework, “Mincerian” earnings equations and personnel economic models of optimal 
mixes of youth and mature human capital all find confirmation in these estimates. 
Keywords: growth, demography, age structure 
JEL classification: J13, J16, O11, 040 
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1. Introduction 
“What will you do, when you have built all the houses, roads, town halls, electric grids, water 
supplies and so forth, which the stationary population of the future can be expected to require?”
Keynes (1937:100). 
A Spanish woman reaching childbearing age in 1970 could expect to have 3.6 
children; a similarly aged Spanish woman in 2000 could expect to have only 1.2 children. 
In countries such as Spain, with declining fertility rates and slow growing populations, 
mature cohorts account for larger shares of the total population than they do in fast 
growing ones [Greenwood and Seshadri (2002)]. Demographic transitions such as this, 
though partly endogenous, can also exert independent effects on the macro-economy. 
This is because the size and structure of the current working age population is a function 
of past fertility and hence predetermined with respect to current economic conditions 
and institutional arrangements (Feyer 2002). Demographic transitions are therefore both 
a product of, and a causal factor in, economic growth; the latter of which is the focus of 
this paper1.
The causal relationship between demographic maturity and economic growth can 
be viewed in two ways. First, a country that undergoes a fall in its birth rate experiences 
an initial decline in the ratio of dependents to working age persons. This, in turn, has a 
positive effect on economic growth through declines in the dependency ratio (i.e., fewer 
mouths to feed) and consequent increases in the relative size of the workforce. Savings 
rates and labour force productivity may also be affected by a growing working age 
population; though the direction of these latter two channels is more ambiguous, given 
that savings follows a lifecycle profile and that general human capital embodied in 
education and specific human capital embodied in experience varies systematically by 
age of worker. 
These latter two observations highlight a less often discussed, but equally 
important link between demographic transitions and economic performance. By making 
a country more mature, falling birth rates affect not only the size but the structure of 
                                                          
1 Galor and Weil (1996) made fertility decline part of their feedback-loop model, whereby declines 
in fertility (brought about by rising woman’s wages) raise capital per worker, and hence growth. 
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the working age population. A country with a greater number of mature persons will 
differ substantially from one that is younger, even if both have workforces that are of 
the same relative size. In particular, if we consider that labour force participation and 
productivity peak sometime during the prime working ages of 35 and 54 when the 
balance between formal education and experiential human capital reaches its optimum— 
then the productive capacity of a society with a large fraction of prime age persons (35 
to 54 year olds) should be greater than of one with many new entrants in the labour 
force. Insights from the firm-level simultaneously reinforce and attenuate this view 
[Lazear and Freeman (1997)]. Not only do firms require workers with experience, they 
also require the right combination of youth and maturity; highlighting the need for an 
optimal, rather than a strictly greater, number of prime age workers in order to 
maximise output. 
 In this paper we analyse both maturity effects in the context of the empirical 
growth literature. Using a large cross-country panel spanning the past fifty years, we 
show that there is a positive relation between the ratio of working age persons (aged 15 
to 64) over the total population and per capita GDP growth. This finding is quite robust 
to specification changes and specifications which consider the potential role of 
endogeneity caused by outward and inward migration. We also find that just as 
experience tends to have a curvilinear relationship with respect to individual 
productivity, so too at the macro-level, the maturity of a given working age population —
proxied by the ratio of prime age persons (aged 35 to 54) over the total working age 
population (aged 15 to 64) exhibits positive but decreasing returns. We calculate that 
the turning point for maximum growth occurs when roughly 36 percent of a country’s 
working age population is aged 35 to 54. 
Apart from their empirical value, these findings are important in three other 
respects. First, they help explain a number of the well known productivity “miracles” of 
the last half century. In keeping with recent findings by Feyer (2002) and Bloom and 
Willimson (1998), much of Southeast Asia’s robust economic performance in particular 
Japan’s post-war economic takeoff and its decade long slump during the 1990s can be 
attributed to changes in both the size and structure of the working age population. The 
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results also shed light on the divergence over the last twenty years between rich and 
poor nations, which has occurred at the same time as rich nations have aged while poor 
nations have seen their working age populations grow younger. 
Lastly, the findings may also be relevant for the future as the positive effect of a 
demographic transition with respect to economic growth may be ultimately just that: 
transitional. According to United Nations demographic projections, persistently low 
birth rates will produce a decline in the size of the working age population and an 
increase in old-age dependency ratios in most high income economies over the next fifty 
years. This process of population “aging” has already raised concerns over spiralling 
healthcare costs, the sustainability of public pension systems and fears of dampened 
economic performance. Our results show, however, that in terms of economic growth, the 
impact of population aging will not be so clear-cut2. In particular, taking current 
population projections as given, our empirical results suggest that the negative impact of 
falling working age populations will be partially compensated for by positive age 
structure effects during the first half of the coming century. This is particularly relevant 
for a number OECD countries (i.e., Germany, Italy, and Japan) currently affected by 
low fertility rates and rapid demographic transitions. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 asks how it is that age 
structure might affect economic growth and income per capita. It discusses both macro 
and micro evidence related to the age structure of the population and suggests why there 
may be a benefit to countries that witness a demographic transition of the type 
described in our opening paragraph. Section 3 discusses the empirical approach. Section 
4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the results along with robustness checks. Section 
5 also presents the results of our sensitivity analysis. Section 6 uses the results to inform 
us about historical cross-country episodes and about the future growth prospects for a 
selected group of OECD and Non-OECD countries facing the most acute aging 
pressures. Section 7 concludes.
                                                          
2 The current literature on the effects of population aging has mainly looked the consequences of falling 
working age populations and has failed to adjust for changes in the age structure of the population. A well 
known example are the ECOFIN (2001) projections, which only use the size of the working age population 
(1st order effects) to predict future growth rates. These overstate productivity and growth rate declines for 
countries with persistently low birth rates over the last thirty years (i.e., principally Germany and Japan). 
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2. How Does Demographic Maturity Affect Economic Growth? 
2.1. Maturity and the “Canonical” Growth Literature. 
Can demographic maturation stimulate, rather than dampen, economic growth? 
To answer that question we first examine the potential effects of a maturing population 
on the growth rate of income per-capita through the lens of the neo-classical production 
function, where output growth is a function of factor accumulation and technological 
efficiency. To fix ideas, consider the basic Solow-Swan production function augmented 
with human capital: 
[1]        EDDE  1)()( itititit LAHKY
Here the impact of maturity will depend on the adjustment of the determinants 
of output —i.e., labour supply L, physical capital K,  human capital H and an index of 
technical efficiency A to changes in age structure. 
 The most obvious link between maturity and output can be seen if we simply 
trace through the effect on labour supply L of a constant or rising birth rate in t-1
followed by a subsequent decline at time t (i.e., the effect of a “baby boom” and a “baby-
bust” on the economy). As a reference point we take the case of Japan, which as seen in 
Figure 1 and Table 1, follows this pattern fairly closely. At time t, the demographic 
transition which began a decade earlier begins to have an impact over potential labour 
supply, since an increasing ratio of working age persons over the total population 
increases Li, which in turn positively affects Yit. This is the positive first order
(mechanical) effect of a demographic transition. 
[Figure 1] 
However, demographic transitions affect not only the size but the structure of the 
working age population, thus playing a potentially important role in capital 
accumulation, both physical K and human H. This is the second order effect of a 
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demographic transition on growth3. In a country where the birth rate has fallen for any 
length of time, a predetermined maturation of the working age population will occur at 
time t+15 the earliest age at which a person typically can start to work. A higher ratio 
of working age persons and a working age population made up of a larger cohort of 
mature (35 to 54 year olds) versus young (15 to 34 year olds) workers, in turn, affects 
the stock of physical capital through its impact on savings. Under the standard life-cycle 
model, individuals smooth consumption over the course of their lifetime, hence, they 
borrow when they are young and save when they are economically active, and in 
particular, save most when they are of prime working age4. This implies that a 
demographic transition will have a positive impact on aggregate savings and indirectly 
affect the stock of capital in that fewer dependents and a greater percentage of prime-
age persons will increase the savings rate. An increase in exogenous savings brought 
about by the growth and maturation of the working age population should therefore 
have a positive (second-order) effect on per capita output. 
                                                  [Table 1] 
The link between age structure and human capital accumulation H centres on education 
and learning-by-doing, two factors essential in fostering productivity. The stock of 
individual human capital peaks when the balance between formal education and 
experience reaches its optimum5. This tends to happen sometime during the prime 
working ages of 35 and 54, after which diminishing returns begin to set in6. An economy 
with a fat cohort of prime age workers should therefore be more productive than an 
                                                          
3 To see this more clearly, imagine two countries sharing working age populations of the same relative size. 
Both are equally mature in the sense that both share the same relative “mean” level of working age persons. 
The first order effect should therefore be identical. However, one country by virtue of having had more 
recent falls in its fertility rate has a greater mature share of workers than the other. Two workforces of the 
same relative size may therefore be composed of either a greater share of young (15-34) or prime-age (35-54) 
workers. 
4 See Modigliani (1986) and  Modigliani and Ando (1963) for classic references in this regard.
5 Fougere and Merette (1999) also suggest that under a situation of scarce employment, incentives to human 
capital investment increase. 
6 More precise estimates can be found if we consider the typical Mincer (1974) wage regression, where 
experience is entered along with its square to reflect the rising but diminishing returns of experience with 
respect to productivity. Empirical evidence suggests that wages peak for US workers with 33 years of 
experience [Kruger and Pischke (1992)]. If workers earn their marginal product, then earnings equations 
imply a 50 percent difference between the productivity of a 20 year old worker as compared to that of a 50 
year old with the same formal level of schooling. This Mincerian regression evidence, though fast 
approaching its thirty year mark, is still considered by most labour economists as the most useful 
“workhorse” model of wage determination [Lemieux (2002)]. 
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economy populated by younger workers. This type of “Mincerian” evidence also implies 
that a turning point should be observed with respect to output per person, whereby too 
many workers at the mature end of their working lives should be associated with slower 
output growth. 
 Finally, with regards to the potential impact of maturity on technical efficiency, 
A, endogenous growth models allow for the introduction of several links between 
demography and technology. At the macro-level, some authors argue that new entrants 
in the labour market are the main channel for the creation of new knowledge and 
innovation [Simon (1986) and Ermisch et al., (1987)]. At the individual level, there is 
evidence to suggest that the capacity to invest in new technology is significantly 
constrained by age, but that technological adoption may actually be accelerated, rather 
than hindered, by the presence of mature workers [Weinberg (2002)]. 
The Mincerian and technological adoption evidence above suggests that 
economies benefit from having more experienced workers, but only up to a certain point, 
since a mix of young and old workers is likely to produce the most productive work 
environment. Imperfect substitutability between the human capital of young and old 
workers may therefore be a key feature of aggregate production and may even help 
explain why per capita output does not converge instaneously, as some open-economy 
growth models suggest [Kremer and Thomson (1998)]. Micro-level evidence drawn from 
the field of personnel economics [Lazear and Freeman (1996)] reinforces this view, in 
that mature workers are easier to monitor, have greater firm specific human capital and 
more general skills learned on the job, whereas young workers, though they impose 
larger monitoring costs on the firm7, bring with them new ideas and general human 
capital embodied in formal education. 
2.2. The Effect of Second Order Maturity
In order to explore the implications of the above reasoning a bit further, consider 
a variant of eq. [1], where an economy consists of firms that produce output Y with 
                                                          
7 This emerges because true ability and effort is difficult to observe, and takes time to be realized by 
employers.
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technology A but instead of utilising one type of labour, utilize mature mL and young 
yL labour inputs, 
[2]   EDDE T  1)()( ym LLAHKY ,
where T  is the marginal product of yL  relative to mL . If workers were perfect 
substitutes then relative productivity would be 1 T , and there would be no single mix 
of both labour inputs that would maximise output. In equilibrium with perfect 
substitutability, firms would be indifferent to the proportional mix of young and mature 
labour employed. However, if mature and young labour are not perfect substitutes (i.e., 
mature labour is more productive 1T ), but both young and mature human capital are 
necessary in production, then firms maximise labour output using a production function 
similar to that found in Neumark (1988): 
[3]      myym LLLLAY /)( GT  ,
where G is akin to a “discrimination” coefficient capturing the desire of firms (other 
things equal) for mature workers. In this set up, however, employers care about the 
relative level of mL rather than the absolute level since they recognize that some balance 
between youth and experience is required. Maximization of [3] implies that the (falling) 
marginal product from one additional unit of yL  is not fixed, but depends of the relative 
level of yL . The impact of this type of production structure on output is captured in 
Figure 2, where the effect of maturity with respect to output growth follows an inverted 
U pattern. A country populated with an optimal level of mature human capital moL
relative to the total working population, will grow faster than a country which has either 
too few mL1  or too many
mL2  mature workers. Note, as well, that persistent birth rate 
declines will push countries past the optimal maturity ratio, ultimately dampening 
rather than promoting growth. 
[Figure 2] 
This model does not preclude heterogeneity as G may vary across firms or different 
economies; i.e., economies with a higher G  will employ more mL  at the expense of yL .
Why would firms or economies differ in their need for mature labour? Two reasons seem 
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plausible. First, the more idiosyncratic are firm or country experiences, the higher will 
be G  since mature workers are likely to have better knowledge of these idiosyncratic 
details. Second, to the extent that on-the-job skills are relatively more important than 
skills learned in formal education, mature workers will again be more desired since there 
will be a greater need for “mentors” and senior workers fill that role better than younger 
ones.
At the cross-country level, this model implies that second order maturity may 
not always be associated with improved economic performance. Specifically, a greater 
cohort of mature workers unambiguously benefits a country’s output per capita only if 
an economy is are already below the optimum8; if firm or country experiences are highly 
idiosyncratic; or if on-the-job skills are relatively more important than general skills. 
Otherwise, most countries prefer a more balanced workforce composed of both young 
and mature human capital. 
3. Empirical Methods 
The theoretical discussion above has highlighted two testable implications related 
to maturity and economic performance: (1) that the first order effect of a demographic 
transition should have an unambiguously positive impact on economic growth  (i.e., the 
coefficient associated with the ratio of working age persons aged 15 to 64 over total 
population should always have a positive sign with respect to growth); and (2) that 
second order maturity should have a positive but curvilinear effect with respect to 
economic growth (i.e., increases in the proportion of working age persons aged 35 to 54 
over the potentially active population should exhibit positive diminishing returns with 
respect to economic growth). Methods for estimating each of these empirical propositions 
are modelled below. 
                                                          
8 If firms are already past the optimum, they benefit from a falling rather than a rising ratio of mature age 
workers. 
 15
Most empirical studies that analyse cross-country economic growth make use of 
the so-called convergence equation, popularised by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), and 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), which follows a general specification like this: 
[4]  itititiiitit eXyayyy  '  TE lnlnlnln 1 ,
where iyln'  is the growth rate of per capita GDP for country i between time t and 
time t+1, and is regressed against ity  the per capita GDP for country i at time t ,a
time-invariant country specific effect ia , a vector of determinants of growth itX , and 
ite the error term. This framework is generally used to test the conditional convergence 
proposition, which states that the rate of growth between two periods is a decreasing 
function of initial levels of income per-capita and distance to the steady state. The 
vector itX therefore controls for differences in the steady state across countries, which is 
generally proxied by the share of output devoted to accumulated physical ks and human 
capital hs , the growth rate of population n, the exogenous rate of technological progress 
(- ) and the depreciation rates ( kV and hV  assumed to be equal). 
 An equation like this can be derived from the augmented Solow model in eq.[1] 
with constant returns to scale, but is also consistent with some endogenous growth 
models that predict different forms of convergence to the steady state. In this paper we 
are not interested in validating different models of economic growth. We instead use this 
specification because it captures most of the common factors that have traditionally 
been considered as determinants of growth9. Specifically, we treat the age structure of 
the population as an added proxy for the steady state to estimate a version of [5] with 
demographic measures added. Both first and second order age structure effects are 
captured with these added measures. The variable mature captures the first-order aging 
effect and is defined as: 
                                                          
9 The specification also resembles recent work by Persson (2002), Malmberg (2001) and Bloom, Williamson 
and Canning (2001) which has linked age structure to growth and therefore provides some approximate 
comparably for our results.
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The variable is a ratio which measures the number of potentially active persons 
(15-64) W, over the total population P. Our expectation based on our theoretical 
discussion in section 2, is that countries with higher shares of mature persons will 
experience faster growth. Our second ratio measure, primeage, captures the fact that 
both productivity and labour force participation rates vary by age.  We use the number 
of persons aged 35 to 54 over the total number of potentially active persons to estimate: 
[5b]    
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This measure recognizes that the productive capacity of a society with a high 
fraction of people in the prime age of their careers is higher than that of a society with 
many new entrants in the labour force. Beyond a certain threshold, however, having too 
many mature workers may actually dampen growth. Our preferred estimates therefore 
preserve the primeage variable as a ratio measure along with its square: 
[6]  ititititititii eprimeageprimeagematureXyay  '
2
21lnlnln MMGTE .
Second order maturity effects estimated as in [6] will test whether there is a 
significant turning point in the data and allow us to more accurately identify the non-
linear effects of second order maturity implied under the Mincerian and personnel 
economic literature surveyed. Finally, note that by controlling for the stock of physical 
capital and technical progress, the only age structure channels captured by [6] are those 
arising from experiential human capital and firm level maturity effects described in 
sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. 
 17
4. The Data and Descriptive Findings 
This paper employs a composite dataset made up of version 6.1 of the Penn 
World Tables (2002) and data provided by the United Nations Population Division. The 
Penn World Tables, which Summers and Heston (2002) have been collecting for more 
than a decade, includes observations from 1950 to 2000 for approximately 144 countries. 
It is used primarily for its PPP adjusted measures of income per-capita across countries. 
A second data source, the United Nations World Population Prospects, provides 
corresponding demographic data for 160 countries from 1950 to 2000 —with age structure 
and population projections running until 2050. 
 Table 2 provides a descriptive overview of the patterns of changing age structure 
that have occurred across countries over the past four decades. The table documents 
changes in our two key measures of maturity; i.e., mature [the share of the potentially 
active working age population (15-64) over total (15-65+)] and primeage (the proportion 
of workers aged 35-54 over the entire size of the potential active working age population) 
as well as a third measure primeyouth [the ratio of prime-age workers (35-54) over the 
young (15-34)]. The first row of the table documents the all country total and shows no 
dramatic shift in first order maturity from 1960 to 2000 (the percentage of persons aged 
15 to 64 increased from 56.4 in 1960 to 60.9 in 2000). Instead it confirms the U shaped 
pattern in second order maturity brought about by the delayed effect of the post-war 
baby boom, which from the 1960s to 1980s, made many national workforces younger 
than their historical averages. 
Comparisons of age structure patterns for different country groupings —such as 
between OECD and Non-OECD countries as seen in Row 2 and in Figure 3— show that 
the all country average masks a marked diversity of age structures. Countries in the 
OECD have had larger percentages of mature persons over the total working age 
populations from the 1960s onward, and despite having grown younger in the 1970s and 
1980s, the OECD never approached levels found in the Non-OECD world. In 2000,  42.7 
percent of the OECD´s working age population was aged 35 to 54 versus 33.7 percent 
for the non-OECD world. Specific country examples in Row 6 also show the 
heterogeneity that is masked if we look only at world totals in Row 1. 
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[Figure 3] 
Rows 3 through 5 of Table 2 illustrate what are probably more interesting facts 
about age structure over the past 40 years: the dramatic difference in the proportion of 
prime age workers between countries with high and low indices of civil liberties and 
individual freedom and the consistently higher proportions of prime age workers in more 
equal societies (as measured by the Gini ratio) and in countries with greater political 
participation (as measured by the percentage of voting age population who casts a vote). 
[Table 2] 
One way to summarize the shifts in age structure across country groupings and 
illustrate the resulting differences in the distribution of per capita income and savings 
rates is to define convergence club groups based on quartiles of per capita income and 
savings rates, and then compare the percentage of prime age workers in these 
convergence clubs over four periods10. This method is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 
which show the percentage of mature workers (using our three definitions) for two 
different quartiles —a quartile grouping based on real GDP per capita (measured in PPP 
terms) and a second based on savings rates. Panel A in figure 4 shows that in all three 
periods, the percentage of potentially active workers was highest among countries in the 
upper income quartiles. Panel A in Figure 5 shows an even more consistent tendency 
towards increasing proportions of working age persons amongst countries with high 
saving rates. 
Panels B and C use primeage and primeyouth measures of maturity. The pattern 
in Panel C demonstrates perhaps the most dramatic divergence in age structure between 
upper and lower convergence club countries, with countries in the lower quartiles 
demonstrating a much lower share of prime age workers relative to the young. By the 
year 2000, top quartile countries basically have equal shares of young and mature 
workers whereas in lower quartiles that share is still below 50 percent (i.e., two young 
workers for ever one prime age worker). 
[Figures 4 and 5] 
10 Each period is defined as the average in and around the year identified. For example, 1960 refers to the 
average of observations made from 1958 to 1962. This is done to smooth out any possible cyclical and 
measurement variation in the data.
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 Finally, note that the 1980 data for figure 4, which shows a similar pattern to the 
1960 and 2000 observations, has the lowest percentage of prime age workers for all 
quartiles and also the least mean difference between upper and lower convergence club 
groups. This is the effect of the post-war baby boom that was mentioned above, and 
which made mature countries converge, in demographic terms at least, with their 
younger counterparts. The fact that income gaps between the two sectors remained 
relatively stable during this period is indicative of the possible significance of 
demographics in accounting for convergence (divergence) episodes and the sustained 
divergence of per capita output observed across countries today. In summary, the 
descriptive cross-country evidence indicates the following: 
x Table 2 and Figure 3 demonstrate that the post war baby boom (the period of 
high birth rates from 1945 to 1965 in many occidental economies) made mature 
and young countries converge in terms of the primeage ratio (35-54/15-64) 
between 1960 and 1980 and then diverge again afterwards. 
x Figures 3 and 4 show that the convergence in age structures during this period 
also corresponds to relative stability in the income differential between mature 
and young countries (compare 1980 to 1960 and 2000 respectively in Figure 4). 
x Figure 5 shows that savings rates in particular are highly correlated with a more 
mature population as predicted under the standard life-cycle framework. 
To see how quantitatively “important” these age structure differences are in 
explaining cross-country growth rates, we turn now to the results of our formal empirical 
analysis as outlined in section 3. 
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5. Results  
We estimate [6] using a balanced panel of 84 countries11. The sample is split into 
4 ten year periods beginning in 1960 and ending in 2000. This gives us a total of 364 
observations. Our dependent variable is the percentage change of GDP per capita over a 
10 year period12. The values of our steady state and demographic variables are all 
initially proxied by their ten year averages. A list of countries along with variable 
definitions is provided in the Appendix. 
We use fixed-effect (within group) estimations as our benchmark since no 
justification is needed for treating country specific effects as uncorrelated with our 
steady state variables (as is assumed under the random effects model). Furthermore, the 
within-group estimates are the most appropriate form of panel estimation for inter-
country comparisons since we can be confident that differences between countries are 
treatable as parametric shifts of the regression function (Green 2001: 567). However, 
recognizing that there is also some cause for treating individual effects as random 
(Mundlak 1978) and that the specification of our model may need to distinguish between 
the effects of permanent and transitory changes in maturity on growth (see section 6 
below), we present the random effect results alongside the within estimations. 
Table 3 reports estimates of equation [6], with all variables measured in logs13.
The coefficients in column 1 imply that the unconditional first order effect of maturity is 
decidedly positive14. Specifically, a one percent increase in the ratio of persons aged 15 to 
64 over the total population increases economic growth by 1.08 percent over the course 
of a decade. Given that the ten year compound average GDP growth rate was 19.8 for 
the entire sample  period,  these impacts appear very small. However, if we calculate this 
                                                          
11 Countries are often missing data and hence drop out of our sample. Out of the 106 countries that had 
complete LHS data, 22 were either missing two or more key pieces of RHS data or were categorised as 
having  low quality data by Summers and Heston. We therefore chose to focus on a high quality balanced 
sample in order to run our estimates. 
12 The decision to employ a 10 year period is threefold. First, demographic variables are collected by a 
national census prepared every decade, while intervening figures are often obtained by merely linearly 
interpolating figures of two consecutive census periods. More importantly, it is difficult to find significant 
changes in the demographic variables in shorter time-periods. Finally, 10 year growth rates also smooth out 
any short-run output fluctuations. 
13 As is common in the literature, the values 0.02 and 0.03 are employed for our measure of technological 
progress ș and depreciation ı, respectively. 
14 The estimate is unconditional in the sense that we leave out the structure of the working age population 
(primeage) as a control. 
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unconditional first order effect using a more realistic increase in the ratio of working age 
persons (over the course of decade) we get a slightly different picture. A five percent 
increase in the average number of persons aged 15 to 64 over the total population 
which is equivalent to a 3 percentage point increase in a mature ratio whose starting 
level is 60 percent— now leads to a more important 5.4 increase in the ten year growth 
rate. 
Controlling for second order effects (column 2) dampens the mature coefficient 
slightly a five percent increase in the relative size of the working age population shifts 
decade growth by 4.5 percent but with the estimates remaining significantly positive. 
The findings in column 2 also suggest that second order effects have a positive impact on 
medium term growth15. However, the estimates for the primeage coefficient are half those 
of first order effects and insignificant at conventional 10 percent levels. 
[Table 3] 
Two problems, however, exist with the estimations in columns 1 and 2. First, one 
possible reason for the lower than expected and insignificant primeage coefficient is that 
the effect of second order maturity with respect to growth is not properly captured with 
the log share of primeage workers. What we need is a squared term that accurately 
identifies the turning point in the data, as specified in eq. [6]. The results in columns 1 
and 2 have therefore not confirmed, or, refuted our expectations surrounding the non-
linear effects of a working age population with respect to growth. Moreover, a second 
and potentially more serious specification problem exists with the endogeneity of our 
demographic variables, which are measured as ten year averages. The problem of 
endogenity is addressed below. 
5.1 Does Faster Growth Induce Greater Demographic Maturity? 
One possible explanation that is not captured in the estimates above is the 
possibility that the relationship between maturity and economic performance is largely 
spurious and the result of either endogenous fertility decisions or ex post migration 
                                                          
15 The coefficient attached to primeage should be interpreted with respect to the log ratio of the population 
aged 15 to 34 and 55 to 64 over total working age population since these ratios sum to 1. The decision to 
drop these two variables allows for a more intuitive interpretation of the primeage coefficient. 
 22
decisions. Taking each possibility in turn, the first question we may ask is the following: 
“Why might an increase in the mature share of the working age population caused by a 
period of rising then falling birth rates twenty years earlier lead to an increase in 
economic growth and levels of income per capita today?” As noted by Shimer (1999), one 
possibility is that birth rates are endogenously determined by the collective decisions of 
parents16. While endogenous fertility decisions are undoubtedly important, they seem an 
unlikely source of endogeneity in this instance. Our growth estimates are based upon a 
10 year growth rate and our demographic age structure measures are predetermined at a 
minimum fifteen years prior to our performance measures. This means that parents in a 
given country from year t-25 would have to anticipate the state of the economy in year t
in order for our results to be compromised. Economists rarely agree on the performance 
of the economy in the next quarter let alone quarter of a century. Such precise beliefs 
amongst households not only seem implausible but stand opposed to much of the 
empirical evidence17.
 The second possibility, which is harder to ignore, is that the relationship between 
age structure and growth may be caused by migration patterns. It may be that working 
age person’s move from regions that are depressed to regions where the economy is 
strong. Part of this effect would be picked up in our panel estimation since countries 
with persistently stronger economic performance would be captured by the country i´s
fixed effect. A remaining portion of the migration effect, however, would remain since a 
temporary increase in economic performance in country i might temporarily attract more 
working age person’s and simultaneously lower the proportion of working age persons in 
slower growing country j. To mitigate the possibility of reverse causality we measure our 
first and second order demographic variables —mature and primeage at the beginning of 
                                                          
16 Suppose parents expect strong economic growth in the future, this may lead to an increase in fertility 
today, as parents anticipate being able to support more children. This effect, however, is only transitory as 
more parents begin to realise that by having more children, the relative opportunity of each individual child 
diminishes by labor market overcrowding, and so the fertility rate begins to fall thus producing the 
demographic transition described earlier. 
17 This does not contradict the generally accepted notion of the modern growth regime, which is 
characterized by steady state growth in both income per capita and technology [Galor and Weil (2000)]. In 
this regime there is a negative relationship between the level of output and the growth rate of population. 
According to Galor and Weil (1996), however, a positive feedback loop may also be present, whereby falling 
birth rates raise capital per worker and accelerate growth even further. What we are doing, therefore, is 
isolating the “delayed” effect of this latter demographic reinforcing mechanism on growth. 
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each growth period rather than as the decade average18. The econometric specification 
can be improved upon even further by controlling for the possible simultaneity bias of 
our steady-state regressors (i.e., education and investment). Columns [3] and 4] in Table 
3 show the results if we measure all RHS variables as initial starting period values. 
Controlling for potential endogeneity does indeed have an important effect over 
our initial first order estimations. In column [3] one notices quite strikingly that the 
coefficient for mature falls by almost 50 percent as compared to column [1] (from 1.080 
to 0.593). Though the coefficient remains significant, such a drop is indicative that 
controlling for potential endogeneity provides a more conservative estimate of the effect 
of demographic maturity on economic performance. What is also noticeable in column 
[4] is how well the anticipated non-linear second order maturity effect shows up in our 
estimations with the squared primeage term. In column 4 a turning point is significantly 
identified for our primeage variable. Increases in the ratio of workers aged 35 to 54 over 
total population increase the 10 year growth rate up to 0.361 and thereafter increase 
growth at a decreasing rate. Or, alternatively stated, evaluated at an initial level of 34 
percent, the effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio of prime age workers over 
total population on the 10 year growth rate is 5.6 percent, whereas a 5 percentage point 
change increases growth by only 2.8 percent. 
In terms of our steady state variables, results are broadly consistent with the 
“classical” convergence literature [Sala-I-Martin (1996)], in that the coefficient attached 
to initial per capita GDP itY  is significantly negative across all specifications, and that 
ks  (as proxied by the average investment share) is significant and positive. Both the 
average rate of population growth n (adjusted for rates of depreciation and technological 
                                                          
18 This of course is not a perfect solution. The use of lagged instrumental variables could perhaps provide 
more credible results. The problem is that if we take prior period demographic measures as our instruments 
we lose at least one period of observations, (which in a four period panel  means 25 percent of our sample). 
The ideal solution would be to find immigration data by age and adjust the mature and primeage ratios 
accordingly. Unfortunately UN population data only provided immigration numbers for a select number of 
countries. Moreover, emigration numbers were not included for any countries. 
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progress) and human capital ks (proxied by the average years of schooling) were 
insignificant19.
5.2 Robustness Check I: Estimates Using Per Capita Output Levels  
An added check of the demographic maturity effect is conducted in table 4, 
which repeats the estimations in Table 3 using per capita income levels as our dependent 
variable. Apart from the exclusion of the conditional convergence term, the same 
specification as in our growth estimation is used in both tables. The results are 
supportive of a positive first order and an inverse second order effect. The first order 
effect is larger and the turning point in our fixed effect estimation is slightly lower than 
for our growth estimates; income levels peak (other things equal) when roughly 0.345 of 
the working age population is aged 35 to 54. 
[Table 4]
5.3 Robustness Check II: OECD Sub-sample Estimates 
The estimates in Tables 3 and 4 are repeated for a sub-sample of OECD 
countries in Tables 5 and 6. We restrict our focus to the 23 countries which have been 
part of the OECD since the 1960s. The advantage of analysing this sub-sample is that 
institutionally these countries are much more similar than the entire sample, but 
demographically they still differ quite significantly from each other. This may help to 
isolate more precisely the effects of maturity on growth. The results in Table 5, as 
judged by the R2, confirm that our OECD estimates offer a far better prediction of 
model [6]. The point estimates do not change appreciably from comparable all country 
results in Table 3. The turnaround point for second order maturity occurs at 0.359 and 
the first order effects appear slightly less important (a coefficient of 0.370 vs 0.590). This 
is not surprising since the OECD sample has experienced a relatively greater change in 
the structure of the working age population (see Figure 1 and Table 2) than in its 
relative size over the last fifty years. 
[Tables 5 and 6]
                                                          
19 Using initial periods does very little to alter our steady state variables except for investment share of GDP 
whose coefficient falls from 0.177 to 0.086 when initial periods are used. 
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5.4 Robustness Check III: Why not adjust for labour force participation rates? 
It is important to note that the data used in the previous estimations did not 
control for the size of the economically active population. As such, we have measured 
the unconditional effect of the size and structure of the potentially active working age 
population on output, rather than these effects conditioned on effective labour supply. 
We preferred these UN population measures to a similar ILO dataset that adjusts for 
effective labour supply, primarily because participation rates are less reliably measured 
across countries than demographic data and participation rates also likely to suffer from 
greater endogeneity problems with respect to economic performance. 
In principle, however, the different channels through which population might 
impact growth, as described in section 2, would be better captured by the effective 
labour force rather than by the potentially active working age population. Indeed, the 
choice between these two measures might not be irrelevant for the results, since major 
changes in participation rates have been observed in the last four decades in many 
countries. The participation of women, for example, has significantly increased in many 
countries while that of people over 50 has dramatically fallen. Likewise, irregular 
participation in the labour market might be quite relevant in some developing countries. 
Lastly, the use of the potentially active working age population posses the problem that 
this variable might be capturing not only supply side effects as outlined in our 
theoretical framework, but also demand effects related to differences in the composition 
of expenditure by age group. 
In order to see whether our results are robust to the inclusion of effective labour 
supply, three different robustness checks were made. First, total participation rates were 
added to our growth estimates. Specifically, using data from the ILO 
(http://laborsta.ilo.org/), the ratio of the total labour force to total population was used 
as an added control. Apart from this change, the same specification as our growth 
estimation in columns 3 and 4 of Table 320 was used (available upon request). The
                                                          
20 This corresponds to our fixed effect estimation with initial values for correcting for adjusting for 
endogeneity problems. 
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coefficient on this alternative mature variable is again highly significant, though its 
value does fall. When, for example, the same specification as in our growth estimation in 
column 4 of Table 3 is used, the coefficient on our first order effect is 0.571 instead of 
0.590. These results also hold for our level estimates. 
Second, we estimated equation [6] replacing our previous definition of mature 
(the size of the potentially active working age population) by the ratio of total 
participation in the labour market to total population. The results (available upon 
request) are again supportive of a positive first order effect, and an inverse second order 
effect. The results, in fact, turn out to be larger and more significant. These estimates 
were repeated for the OECD and level estimates, and again the results are significant 
and robust to inclusion of participation rates. 
Third, in order to control further for potential demand-side effects associated 
with our population variables we included in our estimates two additional regressors, the 
ratios of private and public consumption to GDP respectively. These variables take into 
account the fact that a more mature population results in a different level and structure 
of government consumption, which, in addition, might have consequences for 
productivity and growth. When including these additional regressors in our estimates, 
the results do not change significantly; the coefficient on mature 0.590 in our original 
estimate in Table 3 falls to 0.573. 
5.5. Sensitivity Analysis: Distinguishing Between Transitory and Permanent 
Changes to Maturity
The estimations above have captured the positive effects of changes in 
demographic maturity; but what happens to a country whose birth rate drops and fails 
to recover? One of the implications of section 2.2 was that the positive effect of a 
demographic transition on economic growth may be ultimately just that transitional. 
This is because a prolonged fall in the birth rate will, in the absence of large scale 
immigration, give rise to working age maturation beyond the point which is optimal, 
thus reversing the positive maturation effects which occur in the short-to-medium term. 
As noted earlier in Figure 2, a country with a long-run average ratio of mature workers 
located at mL2 will experience slower growth than a country with a slightly younger 
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population located at mL3 . Persistent falls in the birth rate also imply that the number of 
working age persons in incoming cohorts is smaller than in outgoing ones, causing the 
relative size of the working age population (our first order effect) to decline. 
In light of these observations, one of the noticeable and somewhat bothersome 
results in Table 3 is the large discrepancy between our fixed and random effect results. 
A standard Huasman test confirms that the coefficients from both estimations are not 
the same. This means that either eq. [6] is incorrectly specified, or that country specific 
effects are indeed correlated with the X´s and that the random effect model is 
untenable. While the latter is the most likely candidate, given our discussion above, the 
former is also a possibility. A clue as to how important this former possibility may be, is 
the fact that the random effect estimator is a weighted average of the estimates 
produced by the between-effect and fixed-effect estimations. One reason, therefore, for 
the discrepancy between the random and fixed-effect estimates may be that average 
(four-decade) changes to second order maturity have a distinct affect on average (four-
decade) growth. 
 To deal with the potential consequences of prolonged maturation we consider a 
variation of model [6], where changes in the (four-decade) average value of primeage for 
an individual country will have a different effect than single period departures from the 
(four-decade) average. To fix ideas, consider equation [7] below: 
[7] itiiiiiii eprimeageprimeagematureXyay  '
2
21lnln MMGTE ,
which is simply a version of model [6] estimated using a between effect estimator. The 
between effect estimator is therefore a proxy for the impact of prolonged (four-period) 
maturation on growth. The coefficient attached to our primeage variable in eq.[7] should 
therefore be attenuated by the effect of permanent falls in the birth rate and consequent 
prolonged primeage maturity beyond the optimal turning point. In other words, if 
permanent and transitory changes in second order maturity exert distinct effects, then 
when we estimate our original model [6] using both between and fixed-effect estimators, 
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we will expect to find significant differences with regards to our primeage coefficients21.
The coefficient attached to our measure of first order maturity, however, should not be 
lowered using the between estimator, since a growing working age population has an 
unambiguously positive effect on growth. 
Table 7 repeats all four specifications in Table 3 with the between estimator and 
shows that the primeage coefficient is not only smaller than the fixed-effect estimate, but 
reverses its sign implying that permanent increases in the percentage of prime age 
workers have negative effects on average growth while the mature coefficient remains 
positive and significant. The fact that a positive change in the permanent ratio of prime 
age workers is associated with slower long run growth implies that, in our sample at 
least, the negative effect of countries who are past their “prime” dominates the effect of 
countries that are below the optimum and which would presumably benefit from more 
long-term working age maturation. 
[Table 7] 
In terms of our demographic maturity coefficients, we find in Column [2] of Table 
7 that a one percent increase in the (four period) average size working age population 
increases the 10 year rate of growth by 1.75 percent while a similar percentage increase 
in  primeage causes growth to decline by 1.57 percent. Annualised, this would imply a 
net 0.018 percent increase in the yearly growth of GDP per capita over the course of 
four decades due to demographic maturation. The relevance of this type of long run 
calculation will be seen more clearly in section 6, where we use cross-country 
demographic data estimate the specific contribution of first and second order maturity 
to economic growth, both over the sample period as well as over the next fifty years22.
                                                          
21 A sign reversal is also possible, depending on whether the primeage average lies well beyond the optimum 
for most of the sample countries. 
22 In results not shown, we also conduct the same analysis for the OECD country sample only. Although the 
signs of our coefficients line up with Table 7, the results are insignificant. This is because we only have 23 
OECD countries to produce our four decade average growth estimates of the between-effect estimator. The 
point estimates in such a small sample are measured with very little precision. 
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6. Implications 
To underscore the importance of the above findings, we take the point estimates 
for countries facing the greatest aging pressures (i.e., the OECD countries in Table 5) 
and make historical “backcasts” and projected estimates of the proportion of annualised 
economic growth that can be accounted for by demographic maturity. The annualised 10 
year growth rate for the OECD as a whole and selected country examples are estimated 
along with the relative contribution of first and second order maturity effects. 
As seen in Table 8 panel B, for the OECD as a whole, the overall effect of 
demographic change from 1960 to 2000 is close to zero (last row of column 5). This does 
not imply that demographic change had no significant impact on growth, rather it 
means that the combined effects of changing working age size and working age structure 
offset each other over the course of four decades (a finding prefigured by our between 
effect estimates). For example, in Table 8 column 1 we see how between 1960 and 1970, 
the effect of second order maturity had a positive effect on growth, contributing 0.15 to 
annual per capita GDP growth (or roughly four percent of the 4.11 in annualised growth 
observed over the course of that decade was due to working age maturation). However, 
this 2nd order effect was slightly attenuated by the fall in the size of the working age 
population during the decade (contributing to a -0.02 drag on annualised growth). The 
overall effect of demographic maturity, expressed in terms of annualised growth, was 
therefore 0.13 out of an average of 4.11 per year. 
[Table 8] 
On average, from 1960 to 2000, the effects of a rising working age population 
were offset by those of a maturing workforce, which to put it bluntly, moved well past 
its “prime”. The effect of the baby boom worked its way through the populations of most 
OECD countries, and stopped contributing to higher economic growth by the late 1980s. 
The last two decades in columns [3] and [4], in particular, witnessed negative 2nd order 
effects. Specific countries, however, fared better than others. As seen in Figure 6 (and 
Appendix Tables 3a and 3b), while Japan, Germany, and Italy were all badly hurt in 
the 1990s by a combination of falling working age ratios and prime age ratios that 
moved past their prime, Ireland still witnessed positive overall maturity effects. More 
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significant in this regard were the experiences of countries like China and India, which 
felt the double benefits of growing 1st and 2nd order maturity.  
[Figure 6] 
Estimates based on United Nations forecasts in Panel D of Table 8 for the 
OECD show that the gloomy predictions associated with population aging are both right 
and wrong. A declining working age population will affect growth negatively, especially 
beginning from 2010 onward. Viewed in isolation, this effect should slow annual growth 
by 0.12 and 0.16 percentage points in the two decades between 2010 and 2030 (columns 
2 and 4). However, the positive effect of a working age structure which moves back to its 
optimal ratio, compensates for this drag on growth for all decades except from 2020 to 
2030 (column 3). Between 2010 and 2020 and between 2040 and 2050, for example, 
second order maturity moves back to the optimum, and more than compensates for the 
fall in first order maturity; making the overall affect of demographic maturity positive. 
In the case of specific countries like Spain, Italy, Germany and Japan, the 
impacts of falling working age populations will have a larger than average negative effect 
on growth over the coming four decades that will not be compensated by 2nd order 
maturity effects. For other OECD countries such as the United States and Ireland, 
declines in the working age population will be less dramatic, more gradual and mostly 
offset by the positive effects of 2nd order maturity (see Appendix Table 3).  
7. Conclusion 
This paper estimated the response of per capita GDP growth to changes in the 
proportion of mature workers across countries. We defined and estimated the effect of 
demographic maturity in two ways. First, a growing cohort of working age persons (15-
64) was found to have a large positive effect on the ten year growth rate of GDP per 
capita. Second, an increase in the number of prime age workers (35-54) as a fraction of 
the total working age population (15-64) was found to have a positive but diminishing 
effect on per capita GDP growth. We estimated that the optimal ratio of prime age 
workers over the potentially active population is approximately 0.360, after which 
diminishing returns set in. 
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These point estimates were then combined with current UN demographic 
projections to forecast the impact of demographic change on economic growth for 
countries facing the greatest aging pressures; namely those in the OECD. We found that 
despite the general concerns expressed by some, the effect of demographic maturity will 
actually be fairly neutral over the coming fifty years. There are two reasons for this. 
First, falls in the size of the working age population brought about by rising old age 
dependents will be partly compensated for by primeage ratios that move back to their 
optimum. Second, the falls in first order maturity will be gradual in most cases, and thus 
in any given decade, the negative effects of a shrinking working age population will not 
be as pronounced. 
Several limitations and prospects for future research characterize this study. 
First, in terms of limitations, one noticeable problem is the fact that by constraining 
technical progress with a predetermined value and using the investment ratio as a proxy 
for the stock of capital, we have not properly identified the lifecycle and technological 
effects of demographic maturity on growth. It may be that the indirect effects of 
maturation on growth, operating through savings and technical efficiency channels, are 
stronger than the direct productivity effects, currently captured in our estimations of 
GDP growth. A second limitation centres on the use of the potentially active working 
age population and its effect on output, rather than examining the demographic effects 
conditioned on effective labour supply. Although endogeneity problems and the lack of 
reliable long-run series of participation rates across countries justify our decision, several 
robustness checks were made to explore the potential impact of this decision on our 
results. Some doubts may still remain about how the use of participation rates by age 
groups would affect our results of the prime-age coefficient. Finally, the use of growth as 
proxy for economic performance can be seen as an additional limitation. As seen in 
section 5.2, one of the implications of demographic maturity may be that it places 
countries in different converge club groupings [Durlauf and Quah (2000)]. Indeed, much 
of the modern literature seems to suggest that modelling the determinants of per capita 
income differentials can tell us as much (or more) about the process of long run growth 
and the long term effects of state variables, than any other method currently available in 
the empirical growth literature [Hall and Jones (1999)]. These limitations therefore 
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provide for plenty future work. Papers which formally model the causal channels linking 
maturity and economic growth and those which estimate the impact of demographic 
maturity in explaining income differentials appear to be fruitful avenues of research. 
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Table 1: Illustrative Effects of Demographic Transition on Maturity and Output Per 
Capita  
Demographic 
Transition 
Effect on 
Maturity 
Anticipated Effect on  
Per Capita GDP Growth  
Maturity Effect
Year Period Birth Rate 
1st order 
15-64
0-65+ 
2nd order 
35-54
15-64 1st order 2nd order 
Overall 
Effect 
1950-64 t(1) Ļ Ĺ ļ + 0 +
1965-79 t(2) Ļ Ĺ Ĺ + + ++ 
1980-94 t(3) ļ ļ Ĺ 0 + + 
1995-09 t(4) ļ Ļ Ļ — — —— 
Note: The table is illustrative of the Japanese case. See figure 1 for source of cell entries. Note that the 
constant proportion of retirees (65+) in later periods (3 and 4) is a function of increases in life expectancy 
which counteract the falls induced by falling birth rates fifty years prior. 
Table 2: Measures of Maturity Across Countries by Selected Characteristics, 1960-2000 
Year 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
 Ratio 
15-64
0-65+ 
Ratio 
35-54
15-65 
Ratio 
35-54
15-34 
Ratio 
15-64
0-65+ 
Ratio 
35-54
15-34 
Ratio 
35-54
55-65 
Ratio 
15-64
0-65+ 
Ratio 
35-54
15-65 
Ratio 
35-54
15-34 
Ratio 
15-64
0-65+ 
Ratio 
35-54
15-65 
Ratio 
35-54
15-34 
Ratio 
15-64
0-65+ 
Ratio 
35-54
15-65 
Ratio 
35-54
15-34 
1. All 0.564 0.339 0.612 0.556 0.334 0.601 0.574 0.319 0.552 0.589 0.323 0.571 0.609 0.352 0.642 
0.624 0.391 0.861 0.621 0.371 0.791 0.638 0.363 0.741 0.662 0.385 0.822 0.668 0.427 1.021 2. OECD 
   Non-OECD 0.552 0.329 0.573 0.543 0.327 0.572 0.561 0.311 0.521 0.573 0.311 0.532 0.597 0.337 0.592 
3. Inequality (Gini 
Ratio) 
               
 <.300 0.617 0.377 0.814 0.631 0.365 0.793 0.639 0.364 0.752 0.651 0.381 0.821 -- -- -- 
 .300-.349 0.574 0.362 0.722 0.599 0.350 0.691 0.594 0.331 0.611 0.607 0.335 0.643 -- -- -- 
 .350-.449 0.589 0.358 0.702 0.568 0.341 0.642 0.573 0.302 0.502 0.572 0.310 0.532 -- -- -- 
 >.450 0.538 0.332 0.591 0.520 0.314 0.532 0.538 0.297 0.483 0.543 0.292 0.461 -- -- -- 
4. Freedom     Score                 
 High [1-3] -- -- -- 0.588 0.356 0.711 0.633 0.345 0.661 0.643 0.367 0.732 0.661 0.412 0.921 
 Medium [4-8] -- -- -- 0.550 0.328 0.583 0.563 0.307 0.512 0.581 0.314 0.541 0.599 0.331 0.571 
 Low[9-12] -- -- -- 0.531 0.294 0.482 0.548 0.296 0.481 0.539 0.292 0.473 0.576 0.324 0.552 
5. Voter Turnout                
 70%-100% 0.584 0.368 0.751 0.591 0.350 0.702 0.605 0.332 0.632 0.613 0.342 0.672 0.633 0.372 0.772 
 50%-69% 0.573 0.351 0.672 0.535 0.321 0.561 0.564 0.301 0.512 0.575 0.309 0.532 0.611 0.354 0.693 
 <49% 0.530 0.319 0.545 0.526 0.311 0.521 0.543 0.299 0.491 0.557 0.307 0.521 0.585 0.328 0.592 
6. Selected Country                
 Argentina 0.637 0.381 0.761 0.637 0.378 0.771 0.614 0.365 0.732 0.604 0.363 0.723 0.626 0.360 0.692 
 Canada 0.590 0.396 0.826 0.619 0.365 0.723 0.679 0.327 0.593 0.680 0.384 0.791 0.683 0.459 1.131 
 China 0.563 0.356 0.652 0.560 0.339 0.612 0.598 0.312 0.531 0.667 0.324 0.562 0.683 0.386 0.752 
 Egypt 0.542 0.331 0.571 0.543 0.318 0.571 0.565 0.289 0.462 0.563 0.313 0.523 0.606 0.344 0.593 
 India 0.568 0.313 0.513 0.559 0.327 0.561 0.574 0.326 0.552 0.592 0.305 0.501 0.617 0.331 0.573 
 Japan 0.641 0.334 0.592 0.689 0.366 0.702 0.674 0.415 0.911 0.696 0.428 1.062 0.681 0.409 1.023 
 S.Africa 0.552 0.335 0.582 0.552 0.321 0.541 0.572 0.309 0.512 0.593 0.318 0.533 0.614 0.337 0.582 
 Spain 0.644 0.380 0.791 0.623 0.404 0.90 0.627 0.382 0.811 0.668 0.350 0.721 0.684 0.401 0.893 
Notes: Demographic data based on United Nations World Population Prospects. A full account of all variables can be found in Appendix Table 1.  
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Table 3: The Effect of Maturity on Economic Growth: Dependent Variable is the 10 year 
compound growth rate (non-annualised) 
Fixed Effect Random Effect
Independent Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]  [1]  [2]  [3] [4] 
Initial period measures No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
1. Ln(Y0) -0.411 
(-9.67) 
-0.411 
(-9.70) 
-0.377 
(-8.99) 
-0.376 
(-8.97) 
-0.172 
(-6.68) 
-0.169 
(-6.83) 
-0.164 
(-5.93) 
-0.157 
(-5.98) 
2. Ln( ks ) 0.178 (4.83) 
0.177 
(4.81) 
0.093 
(3.21) 
0.086 
(2.99) 
0.241 
(9.61) 
0.227 
(9.15) 
0.159 
(6.72) 
0.142 
(6.09) 
3. Ln( hs ) -0.16 
(-0.49) 
-0.002 
(-0.08) 
-0.002 
(0.04) 
0.025 
(0.74) 
0.027 
(1.17) 
0.041 
(1.75) 
0.047 
(2.03) 
0.065 
(2.84) 
4. Ln(N+ ș+ ı) 1.209 
(0.42) 
0.672 
(0.23) 
-2.41 
(-0.84) 
-2.51 
(-0.87) 
-1.703 
(0.82) 
-0.790 
(0.39) 
-3.08 
(-1.45) 
-1.582 
(0.76) 
5. Ln(mature) 1.080 
(4.78) 
0.987 
(4.16) 
0.593 
(2.98) 
0.590 
(2.98) 
0.512 
(2.93) 
0.326 
(1.75) 
0.395 
(2.35) 
0.230 
(1.46) 
6. Ln(primege)   0.251 
(1.27) 
  0.364 
(2.23) 
7. Primeage Ratio    9.975 
(2.02) 
   10.206 
(2.17) 
   Primeage Ratio_sq        -13.849 
(-1.95) 
   -13.102 
(-1.91) 
Obs: 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 
Grps: 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
R2 0.36 0.37 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.30 
Notes: Initial level of GDP is always measured in its initial period to control for conditional convergence. All other 
independent variables are measured as the 10 year period average except for columns 3 and 4 where the initial levels of 
each variable measured at the start of each 10 year growth period are used. The stock of physical capital is the 
investment share of GDP per capita. The stock of human capital is the average years of schooling. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses.
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Table 4: The Effect of Maturity on Per Capita Income: Dependent Variable is the real level of 
GDP per capita (chain index) 
Fixed Effect Random Effect
Independent Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]  [1]  [2]  [3] [4] 
Initial period measures No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
1. Ln( ks ) 0.224 (4.59) 
0.223 
(4.57) 
0.202 
(5.26) 
0.197 
(5.11) 
0.281 
(8.28) 
0.214 
(7.99) 
0.283 
(7.75) 
0.261 
(7.04) 
2. Ln( hs ) 0.125 
(2.98) 
0.140 
(3.18) 
0.165 
(4.02) 
0.185 
(4.10) 
0.181 
(4.58) 
0.268 
(5.33) 
0.247 
(6.50) 
0.283 
(7.06) 
3. Ln(N+ ș+ ı) 3.687 
(0.96) 
3.060 
(0.78) 
-8.061 
(2.07) 
-7.577 
(-1.93) 
-0.766 
(-0.21) 
-1.074 
(-0.30) 
-9.793 
(-2.67) 
-9.242 
(-2.54) 
4. Ln(mature) 3.036 
(12.90) 
2.924 
(11.43) 
2.243 
(9.91) 
2.233 
(9.88) 
3.109 
(13.46) 
2.758 
(11.09) 
2.492 
(11.06) 
2.434 
(10.85) 
5. Ln(primege)   0.291 
(1.11) 
  0.826 
(3.46) 
6. Primeage Ratio    11.155 
(1.65) 
   15.066 
(2.17) 
   Primeage Ratio_sq        -16.135 
(-1.70) 
   -20.214 
(-2.06) 
Obs: 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 
Grps: 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
R2 0.55 0.55 0.48 0.48 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.77 
Notes: Level of GDP per capita is at purchasing parity adjusted levels (using chain index). All independent variables 
are measured as the 10 year period average except for columns 3 and 4 where the initial levels of each variable measured 
at the start of each 10 year growth period are used. The stock of physical capital is the investment share of GDP per 
capita. The stock of human capital is the average years of schooling. The t-statistics are in parentheses
 39
Table 5: OECD Estimates of the Effect of Maturity on Economic Growth: Dependent Variable is 
the 10 year compound growth rate (non-annualised) 
Fixed Effect Random Effect
Independent Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]  [1]  [2]  [3] [4] 
Initial period measures No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
1. Ln(Y0) -0.400 
(7.13) 
-0.404 
(7.03) 
-0.384 
(-7.24) 
-0.404 
(7.57) 
-0.380 
(8.43) 
-0.383 
(8.54) 
-0.383 
(-8.83) 
-0.392 
(9.34) 
2. Ln( ks ) 0.099 (1.03) 
0.107 
(1.08) 
0.052 
(0.67) 
-0.038 
(0.50) 
0.179 
(3.00) 
0.173 
(2.91) 
0.08 
(1.55) 
0.072 
(1.41) 
3. Ln( hs ) 0.061 
(0.48) 
0.066 
(0.51) 
0.195 
(1.73) 
0.260 
(2.22) 
0.169 
(2.97) 
0.165 
(2.92) 
0.181 
(3.41) 
0.197 
(3.73) 
4. Ln(N+ ș+ ı) 6.921 
(1.75) 
6.476 
(1.57) 
5.140 
(1.26) 
6.490 
(1.66) 
-0.277 
(0.11) 
-0.146 
(0.06) 
-2.12 
(-0.86) 
-0.428 
(0.18) 
5. Ln(mature) 1.075 
(3.81) 
1.052 
(3.64) 
0.383 
(1.73) 
0.370 
(1.73) 
0.605 
(2.88) 
0.529 
(2.45) 
0.461 
(2.62) 
0.417 
(2.42) 
6. Ln(primege)   0.078 
(0.40) 
   0.225 
(1.35) 
7. Primeage Ratio    14.685 
(1.86) 
   19.072 
(3.18) 
   Primeage Ratio_sq        -20.583 
(1.96) 
   -25.97 
(-3.20) 
Obs: 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 
Grps: 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
R2 0.68 0.68 0.63 0.66 0.57 0.58 0.53 0.57 
Notes: Initial level of GDP is always measured in its initial period to control for conditional convergence. All other 
independent variables are measured as the 10 year period average except for columns 3 and 4 where the initial levels of 
each variable measured at the start of each 10 year growth period are used. The stock of physical capital is the 
investment share of GDP per capita. The stock of human capital is the average years of schooling. The t-statistics are 
in parentheses.
 40
Table 6: OECD Estimates of The Effect of Maturity on Per Capita Income: Dependent Variable 
is the real level of GDP per capita (chain index)
Fixed Effect Random Effect
Independent Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]  [1]  [2]  [3] [4] 
Initial period measures No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
1. Ln( ks ) 0.003 (0.03) 
0.036 
(0.30) 
0.035 
(0.26) 
0.083 
(0.64) 
0.041 
(0.45) 
0.035 
(0.40) 
0.07 
(0.73) 
0.079 
(0.81) 
2. Ln( hs ) 0.954 
(5.73) 
0.938 
(5.72) 
1.103 
(6.82) 
1.143 
(7.70) 
0.750 
(9.22) 
0.743 
(9.10) 
0.751 
(10.05) 
0.771 
(10.32) 
3. Ln(N+ ș+ ı) 7.827 
(1.20) 
4937 
(0.74) 
-0.791 
(-0.11) 
-1.413 
(-0.20) 
0.824 
(0.18) 
1.077 
(0.23) 
-5.301 
(-1.13) 
-3.606 
(-2.54) 
4. Ln(mature) 1.943 
(4.26) 
1.760 
(3.82) 
1.095 
(2.93) 
0.976 
(2.74) 
1.960 
(5.80) 
1.815 
(5.14) 
1.272 
(4.19) 
1.238 
(10.85) 
5. Ln(primege)   0.546 
(1.78) 
  0.401 
(1.46) 
6. Primeage Ratio    39.118 
(3.00) 
   22.142 
(2.01) 
   Primeage Ratio_sq        -52.581 
(-3.02) 
   -30.214 
(-2.08) 
Obs: 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 
Grps: 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
R2 0.76 0.77 0.70 0.74 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.82 
Notes: Level of GDP per capita is at purchasing parity adjusted levels (using chain index). All independent variables are 
measured as the 10 year period average except for columns 3 and 4 where the initial levels of each variable measured at 
the start of each 10 year growth period are used. The stock of physical capital is the investment share of GDP per 
capita. The stock of human capital is the average years of schooling. The t-statistics are in parentheses
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Table 7: Comparison of Between and Within (Fixed-Effect) Estimates of the Effect of Maturity 
on Economic Growth: Dependent Variable is the 10 year compound growth rate (non-annualised) 
Permanent Changes (Between Effect) Transitory Changes (Fixed Effect)
Independent Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]  [1]  [2]  [3] [4] 
Initial period measures No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
1. Ln(Y0) -0.095 
(3.35) 
-0.074 
(2.83) 
-0.084 
(-2.72) 
-0.068 
(2.34) 
-0.411 
(9.67) 
-0.411 
(9.70) 
-0.377 
(-8.99) 
-0.376 
(8.97) 
2. Ln( ks ) 0.162 (4.49) 
0.125 
(3.67) 
0.157 
(4.49) 
0.120 
(3.53) 
0.178 
(4.83) 
0.177 
(4.81) 
0.093 
(3.21) 
0.086 
(2.99) 
3. Ln( hs ) 0.049 
(1.69) 
0.026 
(0.99) 
0.047 
(1.67) 
0.030 
(1.14) 
-0.16 
(0.49) 
-0.002 
(0.08) 
-0.002 
(0.04) 
0.025 
(0.74) 
4. Ln(N+ ș+ ı) 1.008 
(0.37) 
-2.125 
(-0.81) 
-0.787 
(-0.27) 
-3.165 
(-1.15) 
1.209 
(0.42) 
0.672 
(0.23) 
-2.41 
(-0.84) 
-2.51 
(0.87) 
5. Ln(mature) 0.607 
(2.38) 
1.753 
(4.82) 
0.382 
(1.49) 
1.529 
(3.97) 
1.080 
(4.78) 
0.987 
(4.16) 
0.593 
(2.98) 
0.590 
(2.98) 
6. Ln(primege)   -1.568 
(-4.01) 
   0.251 
(1.27) 
7. Primeage Ratio    -9.855 
(1.02) 
   9.975 
(2.02) 
   Primeage Ratio_sq        7.66 
(0.55) 
   -13.849 
(1.95) 
Obs: 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 
Grps: 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
R2 0.51 0.59 0.45 0.53 0.36 0.37 0.31 0.32 
Notes: Initial level of GDP is always measured in its initial period to control for conditional convergence. All other 
independent variables are measured as the 10 year period average except for columns 3 and 4 where the initial levels of 
each variable measured at the start of each 10 year growth period are used. The stock of physical capital is the 
investment share of GDP per capita. The stock of human capital is the average years of schooling. The t-statistics are 
in parentheses.
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             Table 8: Historical and Projected Within Sample Estimates of 1st and 2nd Order Maturity Effects on 10 Year Per Capita Growth Rates: OECD  
Panel A Initial Period Levels Panel B Estimated Contribution of Maturity To Annual Economic Growth Rate 
Measures 1960
[1] 
1970
[2] 
1980
[3] 
1990
[4] 
2000
[5] 
Maturity 
Effects
1960-70
[1] 
1970-80
[2] 
1980-90
[3] 
1990-00
[4] 
1960-00
[5] 
     
GDP growth 
rate 
4.11 2.60 2.00 1.96 2.66
     
Mature
Ratio 
(1st order) 
0.624 0.621 0.638 0.662 0.667 1st order Effect  -0.02 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.06 
2nd order Effect 0.15 0.03 -0.17 -0.58 -0.14 
Overall Effect  0.13 0.13 -0.04 -0.55 0.08 
OECD  
(23 
countries) 
Primeage
Ratio 
(2nd order) 
0.387 0.371 0.364 0.387 0.418 
     
Panel C Projected Initial Period  Levels Panel D Forecasted Contribution of Maturity To Annual Economic Growth Rate 
Measures 2010
[1] 
2020
[2] 
2030
[3] 
2040
[4] 
2050
[5] 
Maturity 
Effects
2000-10
[1]
2010-20
[2] 
2020-30
[3] 
2030-40
[4] 
2040-50
[5] 
2000-50
[6] 
      
1st order Effect  0.02 -0.12 -0.16 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 Mature
Ratio 
(1st order) 
0.671 0.650 0.623 0.602 0.592
2nd order Effect -0.15 0.24 -0.01 0.11 0.10 0.06 
Overall Effect  -0.13 0.13 -0.17 -0.02 0.04 -0.08 
      
OECD  
(23 
countries) 
Primeage
Ratio 
(2nd order) 
0.423 0.414 0.414 0.409 0.405 
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Figure 1:  The Effect of Demographic Transition on Population Age Structure  
Panel A: Live Births in Japan 1950 to 2000 
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Figure 2: The Hypothesised Effect of Second Order Maturity on the Medium Term Growth Rate 
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Figure 3: Age Structure across Countries, 1960-2000 
Panel A: Ratio of Potentially Active Population (15-64) over Total Population (0-65+) 
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Figure 4: Age Structure by GDP per capita Convergence Club Grouping, 1960, 1980 and 2000 
Panel A: Ratio of Potentially Active population (15-64) over total Population (0-65+) 
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Figure 5: Prime Age Workers by National Savings Rate Grouping, 1960, 1980 and 2000 
Panel A: Ratio of Potentially Active population (15-64) over Total Population (0-65+) 
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Figure 6: Working age population and prime age workers for Selected countries (1950-2050)
   Source: United Nations.
   (a)   Population of age 15 to 64 over total population.
   (b)   Population of age 35 to 54 over population of age 15 to 64.
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Appendix Table 1: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition Source
1. Growth Rate of GDP per capita 
(In Constant Prices) 
Ln of Real GDP per capita is a chain 
index (in 1996 $US prices). For more 
details, see Data Appendix in Penn 
World Tables 6.1. The 10 year growth 
rate was calculated as the differences 
between initial and final period, 
compounded. 
Heston and Summers (2002) 
2. Mature The fraction of the total population of 
potential working age 15-64.  
United Nations (1998) 
3. Primege  The fraction of the working age 
population aged 35-54.  
United Nations (1998) 
4. Voter Turnout The fraction of votes cast by the 
voting age population in national 
elections. 
IDEA (2003) 
5. Freedom Score 
An indicator of the levels of freedom 
in a country's political system. We 
have added together the "political 
rights" and "civil liberties" ratings to 
yield a number from 2 to 14, where 2 
indicates the highest possible level 
and 14 the lowest.  
Freedom House (2003) 
6. National Savings  The percentage share of current 
savings to GDP. Derived by 
subtracting gross consumption and 
government consumption from 100. 
Heston and Summers (2002) 
7. Openness Exports plus imports divided by real 
GDP (chain). 
Heston and Summers (2002) 
8. Inequality Measured as the GINI coefficient. Deininger and Squire (1996) 
9. Consumption & Government Share The component shares of real GDP 
are obtained directly from a 
multilateral Geary aggregation. For 
more details, see Data Appendix in 
Penn Woprd Tables 6.1.  
Heston and Summers (2002) 
10. Price Level Price Level of GDP is the PPP over 
GDP divided by the exchange rate 
times 100. For more detail, see Data 
Appendix in Penn Woprd Tables 6.1.  
Heston and Summers (2002) 
11. Education Average years of schooling. Barro and Lee (2000) 
12. Investment Ratio Ratio of private investment to GDP Heston and Summers (2002) 
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   Total     Total  
Country Non-OECD OECD Observations Country Non-
OECD
OECD Observations
ARG 1  4 MWI 1  4 
AUS  1 4 MYS 1  4 
AUT  1 4 NER 1  4 
BEL  1 4 NIC 1  4 
BGD 1  4 NLD  1 4 
BOL 1  4 NOR  1 4 
BRA 1  4 NPL 1  4 
BRB 1  4 NZL  1 4 
BWA 1  4 PAK 1  4 
CAF 1  4 PAN 1  4 
CAN  1 4 PER 1  4 
CHE  1 4 PHL 1  4 
CHL 1  4 PNG 1  4 
CMR 1  4 PRT  1 4 
COL 1  4 PRY 1  4 
CRI 1  4 ROM 1  4 
CYP 1  4 SEN 1  4 
DNK  1 4 SGP 1  4 
DOM 1  4 SLV 1  4 
DZA 1  4 SWE  1 4 
ECU 1  4 SYR 1  4 
ESP  1 4 TGO 1  4 
FIN  1 4 THA 1  4 
FJI 1  4 TTO 1  4 
FRA  1 4 TUN 1  4 
GBR  1 4 TUR  1 4 
GHA 1  4 UGA 1  4 
GRC  1 4 URY 1  4 
GTM 1  4 USA  1 4 
GUY 1  4 VEN 1  4 
HKG 1  4 ZAF 1  4 
HND 1  4 ZAR 1  4 
IDN 1  4 ZMB 1  4 
IND 1  4 ZWE 1  4 
IRL  1 4 Countries 61 23 94 
IRN 1  4 Total Obs. 244 92 336 
ISL  1 4 
ISR 1  4 
ITA  1 4 
JAM 1  4 
JOR 1  4 
JPN  1 4 
KEN 1  4 
KOR 1  4 
LKA 1  4 
LSO 1  4 
MEX  1 4 
MLI 1  4 
MOZ 1  4 
MUS 1  4 
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Appendix Table 2: List of Countries (Balanced Panel)
           Appendix Table 3a. Historical Within Sample Estimates of first and second order maturity effects of 10 Year Per Capita Growth Rates
    
Panel A             Panel B          
 Measures 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Maturity Effects 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1960-2000
                          
SPAIN Mature Ratio 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.67 0.68 Mature Ratio -0.12 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.06 
 Primeage Ratio 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.40 Primeage Ratio -0.36 0.33 0.13 -0.40 -0.07 
       Overall Effect -0.48 0.36 0.36 -0.31 -0.02 
IRELAND Mature Ratio 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.67 Mature Ratio 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.35 0.14 
 Primeage Ratio 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.39 Primeage Ratio 0.58 -0.21 0.19 -0.16 0.10 
              Overall Effect 0.57 -0.14 0.36 0.19 0.24 
JAPAN Mature Ratio 0.64 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.68 Mature Ratio 0.27 -0.08 0.12 -0.08 0.06 
 Primeage Ratio 0.33 0.37 0.42 0.43 0.41 Primeage Ratio 0.09 -0.69 -0.35 0.50 -0.11 
       Overall Effect 0.36 -0.77 -0.23 0.42 -0.05 
US Mature Ratio 0.60 0.62 0.66 0.66 0.66 Mature Ratio 0.11 0.26 -0.03 0.02 0.09 
 Primeage Ratio 0.41 0.37 0.33 0.38 0.45 Primeage Ratio 0.66 -0.17 0.05 -1.79 -0.31 
              Overall Effect 0.77 0.09 0.02 -1.77 -0.22 
GERMANY Mature Ratio 0.67 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.68 Mature Ratio -0.23 0.16 0.17 -0.05 0.01 
 Primeage Ratio 0.38 0.36 0.41 0.40 0.43 Primeage Ratio 0.09 -0.59 0.22 -0.74 -0.26 
       Overall Effect -0.15 -0.43 0.39 -0.79 -0.25 
ITALY Mature Ratio 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.69 0.68 Mature Ratio -0.08 0.00 0.23 -0.07 0.02 
 Primeage Ratio 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.43 Primeage Ratio 0.03 -0.14 0.22 -0.94 -0.21 
              Overall Effect -0.05 -0.14 0.45 -1.01 -0.19 
CHINA Mature Ratio 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.67 0.68 Mature Ratio 0.38 -0.02 0.65 0.14 0.29 
 Primeage Ratio 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.39 Primeage Ratio -0.06 -0.26 0.14 0.08 -0.02 
       Overall Effect 0.31 -0.28 0.80 0.22 0.26 
INDIA Mature Ratio 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.62 Mature Ratio -0.09 0.16 0.19 0.24 0.12 
 Primeage Ratio 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.34 Primeage Ratio 0.05 -0.11 -0.06 0.20 0.02 
              Overall Effect -0.05 0.05 0.13 0.45 0.14 
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           Appendix Table 3b. Projected Within Sample Estimates of first and second order maturity effects  of 10 Year Per Capita Growth Rate 
Panel A Panel B           
 Measures 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Maturity 
ff
2000-10 2010-20 2020-30 2030-40 2049-50 2000-2050 
                           
SPAIN Mature Ratio 0.68 0.67 0.62 0.54 0.51 Mature Ratio -0.01 -0.08 -0.24 -0.54 -0.20 -0.21 
 Primeage Ratio 0.47 0.48 0.42 0.36 0.43 Primeage Ratio -2.14 -0.46 2.18 0.81 -0.96 -0.11 
              Overall Effect -2.15 -0.54 1.94 0.27 -0.12 -0.12 
IRELAND Mature Ratio 0.67 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.58 Mature Ratio -0.01 -0.16 -0.06 -0.09 -0.22 -0.11 
 Primeage Ratio 0.39 0.44 0.42 0.37 0.41 Primeage Ratio -0.07 -1.06 0.53 0.74 -0.47 -0.06 
              Overall Effect -0.08 -1.21 0.48 0.65 -0.04 -0.04 
JAPAN Mature Ratio 0.64 0.60 0.59 0.56 0.54 Mature Ratio -0.25 -0.23 -0.03 -0.23 -0.09 -0.17 
 Primeage Ratio 0.42 0.46 0.40 0.40 0.42 Primeage Ratio -0.29 -1.34 1.80 0.05 -0.58 -0.07 
              Overall Effect -0.54 -1.57 1.77 -0.18 -0.13 -0.13 
US Mature Ratio 0.68 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.61 Mature Ratio 0.09 -0.15 -0.20 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 
 Primeage Ratio 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.40 Primeage Ratio 1.17 0.60 -0.56 -0.02 0.33 0.30 
              Overall Effect 1.26 0.45 -0.76 -0.03 0.23 0.23 
GERMANY Mature Ratio 0.67 0.65 0.60 0.58 0.58 Mature Ratio -0.06 -0.08 -0.30 -0.15 0.02 -0.11 
 Primeage Ratio 0.47 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.40 Primeage Ratio -1.43 1.80 -0.13 -0.18 0.63 0.14 
       Overall Effect -1.49 1.72 -0.42 -0.33 -0.13 -0.13 
ITALY Mature Ratio 0.66 0.64 0.59 0.54 0.53 Mature Ratio -0.07 -0.11 -0.30 -0.38 -0.03 -0.18 
 Primeage Ratio 0.48 0.44 0.40 0.43 0.41 Primeage Ratio -1.92 1.41 1.15 -0.59 0.37 0.08 
              Overall Effect -1.99 1.30 0.85 -0.96 -0.20 -0.20 
CHINA Mature Ratio 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.62 0.61 Mature Ratio 0.27 -0.18 -0.21 -0.43 -0.11 -0.13 
 Primeage Ratio 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.40 Primeage Ratio -0.71 0.13 0.39 -0.37 0.44 -0.02 
       Overall Effect -0.43 -0.05 0.18 -0.80 -0.28 -0.28 
INDIA Mature Ratio 0.66 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.65 Mature Ratio 0.40 0.23 -0.06 -0.07 -0.17 0.07 
 Primeage Ratio 0.36 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.40 Primeage Ratio 0.04 -0.05 -0.35 -0.18 0.33 -0.04 
              Overall Effect 0.44 0.18 -0.41 -0.26 -0.01 -0.01 
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